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This paper  -a  joint product of the Socialist Economics Rcform Unit, Country Economics Departnmcnt,
and the Country Operations Division, Country Dcpartment IV, Europe, Middle East, and North Africa
Regional Office --- is part of a larger cffort in PRE to study transition in formerly planned or non-market
economies.  This is a revision of a paper prepared for the Conferencc on Privatization and Ownership
Changes in Central and Ea.t Europe held at !hc World Bank in Washington, DC in Junc 1990. Copies of
the paperare available frce from the World Bank, 1818 H-  Street NW, Washington DC 20433. Please contact
CECSE, room N6-025, extension 37188 (28 pages).  September 1991.
This paper is devoted largely to a taxonomic  that give workers and managers a stakc in their
discussion of objectives, constraints, and models  firms, grant a proportion of enterprise equity to
of divestiture in privatization programs, but  the general population (either directly or through
Dhanji and Milanovic also prcsent some con-  mutual funds), and provide revenue for the state
cluding observations.  through general sales.  Such combined options
are beginning to surface in privatization dcbates.
The plethora of divestiture options makes
choice difficult. From an individual govemment  During the period when firms are being
perspective, the choice of preferred model will  readied for divestiturc, govcrnments can be
vary depending on the objectives, the weights  expected to be besieged by waves of requcsts for
given to the objectives, and the estimation of  exemptions, concessions and protection from
practical difficulties in implementation.  In this  firms about to bc privatized or from prospective
respect, there is no correct answer about how to  owners.  It will be extremely important to resist
privatize.  Decisions are highly political, mcdi-  these pressures. Tnc improvement in economic
ated through still inchoate political processes,  performance that is one of the major objectives
invoking strong interests and lobbies, and with a  of reform programs will be considerably diluted
genuine possibility of popular backlash in  if the new market economy is based on an
societies sensitive to wide discrepancies i.  extensive network of special privileges.  More-
wealth.  over, expericnce from elsewhere testitics to the
difficulty of removing concessions once given.
Privatization models are not exclusive. It
may be possible, in fact, to combine solutions
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This is a revision  of the paper prepared  for the Conference  on Privatization  and Ownership  Changes  in Central and
East Europe, organized by CECSE  and EMENA4  and held at the World Bank  in Washington,  D.C., June 13 - 14,
1990. We thank Cecilia Guido-Spano  for the presentation  of the paper.Privatization in East and Central Europe
Objectives, Constraints,  and Models of Divestiture
Farid DIlanji  and Branko Mfilanovicl'
INTRODUCTION
This essay has been prepared for the Conference  on Ownership  Changes and Privatization  in the
Reforming  Economies  of East and Central Europe. It is a taxonomic  exploration  of many issues that
have emerged.  It seeks not to take sides in debates  but rather to point out the reasons behind  the
positions advanced, with a modest but by no means conclusive  commentary. Divestiture  of State
assets--and  sometimes  it is questionable  whether  assets do belong to the State!--is  a lively topic in
every country  in the region.  Hungary has moved  farthest in passing legislation  and, in the process,
has experienced  some controversial  privatization  episodes; its laws may well be amended  by the new,
democratically  elected  government. Poland, at the time of writing, is embroiled  in a profound
discussion  over the contents  of a privatization  law before parliament. Yugoslavia  has begun passing
legislation. Elsewhere, laws are being thought  about and discussed.
The plan of this paper is as follows. In Section  1, we consider the various objectives  of
privatization  programs in the region.  In Section II, the environment  for divestiture  is described and
the constraints  and barriers to privatization  delineated. We conclude  with an analysis  of the more
prominent models advanced  for privatization,  with a discussion  of advantages  and disadvantages.
I.  OBJECTIVES  OF PRIVATIZATION-'
Many motivations  have been given for privatization  in the reforming socialist  economies. We focus
here on four such objectives,  subsuming  others under these headings:
*  Introducing  a market economy.
*  [ncreasing  economic  efficiency.
*  E,tablishing democracy  and guaranteeing  political  freedoms.
*  Increasing  government  revenue.
The logic of each claim is examined  below.
A.  Introduction  of a Market Economy
"Introduction  of a market economy"  is the most frequent rallying cry of economic  reform
movernents--"market' without  adjectives," as Czechoslovakia's  Finance Minister  has declared.  In an
important  sense this motivation  stems from a highly negative  response to the failures of the socialist
1/  The text reflects work in progress and the authors' personal views.
2/  We define privatization  as the transfer of ownership  from the pulblic  to the private  sector.  Other definitions
stipulate  transfer  of control (Hemnunig  and Mansoor  1988), or entitlement  to residual  profits (Yarrow 1986).
I2
economic  model over 40 years.  These failures are well-known: growth has largely halted a.id the
economic  engine appears  to have lost capacity for providing  sustained  improvements  in welfare;
shortages of consumer  goods are frequent and occasionally  intense; the standard  of living (including
environmental  conditions)  is considerably  lower than in virtually  all countries  of Western Europe.
Hope of material improvements  appears dim.  The contrast with the successful "market" economies  is
stark.
Adoption  of a slogan is not sufficient, however, to give it content.  The "mark.  t" is widely
perceived  as an extraordinary  coordinating  mechanism  for decentralized  economic  decis;onmaking.
The new reformers  go farther in maintaining  that markets must be based on extensive  systems of
private property rights; privatization  thus forms a central pillar of the program to create market
economies. In this, the reformers take exception  to a long line of socialist thinking that has argued
that the decentralized  coordination  implied  by the market is compatible  with state ownership  of the
means  of production.3' The difference in position  is partly theoretical, partly derived from
experience.
From theory, the reformers argue that although  the State is the nominal owner of capital, it
cannot exercise  the interests of a real owner--that  is, protect its assets and control their use.  It is
hampered by the "distance" (in an informational  sense) that exists between itself and individual
enterprises, by the sheer scale of the coordination  problem, and, most importantly,  by a fundamental
incentive  flaw, namely, the lack of an unambiguous  link between the efficiency  with which capital is
used and the return to the State.  Since State capital is owned by everyone, it tends to be treated as
"no one's property."  It is constantly  subject to two types of threats:  misallocation,  as exemplified  by
the low efficiency  with which it is invested, and spoliation (decapitalization). In this view, only
private ownership-with private owners directly interested  in capital and profits-can form the basic
institutional  building  block of the market economy.
To support the argument is to appeal to experience. Various reforms have been conducted in
many socialist economies  over the years.  These have tried to provide greater play to market forces
by granting enterprises  greater autonomy in decisionmaking. A major attempt to implement
decentralized  public ownership  has been going on in Yugoslavia  since at least the mid-1950s. Similar
attempts  have characterized  reforms in Hungary since 1968, in Poland since 1982, and in China in the
1980s. With the exception  of rural reforms in China, these attempts  have, by and large, been viewed
as failures. In the best analyzed  reforms"'--Hungary's--it  has been noted repeatedly  that even when
the State no longer legally retains the right to micromanage  enterprises, that does not significantly
diminish State interference  in economic  decisionmaking;  it only takes a different form.  Enterprises
switch from being directly  regulated to being indirectly  regulated  through preferential access  to
credits, discretionary  taxation, and special subsidies. Bureaucratic  meddling  continues, partly as a
reflex reaction  to the potential loss of privilege  and power, but also because  of the fundamental  flaw
noted above: the lack of private owners to whom incenttves  matter.
Creating a market economy  is thus seen as inextricably  tied to the establishment  of the institution
of private property and the privatization  of State assets. Indeed, some have gone farther and argued
3/  For recent expressions see Horvat (1989); Kowalik, quoted in Sarjusz Wolski (1989); Bugaj (1989).
4/  Kornai (1986).3
that the entire success of reform programs is predicated  upon a quick and early privatization
program.!' It is said that the absence  of clearly defined  property rights is responsible  not only for
incentive  failures but has created the entire institutional  and economic  crisis of the socialist State.
The lack of supply responsiveness  at the enterprise level, the near insolvent  condition  of financial
systems, the absence  of labor and capital markets are traced to one cause: the inescapable
motivational  basis of the market economy is missing. Reforms along one or two fronts--for instance,
in restructuring  the financial system or encouraging  labor mobility--are  bound to fail, since the
transmission  belt for eliciting the exrected response  from economic  stimuli will not work.  In this
view, the creation  of extensive  private property rights and the early divestiture  of State assets are
necessary conditions  for credible and successful  reform efforts.
B.  Trereasing  Economic  Efficiency'
Raising  economic  efficiency  through privatization  of State assets is a second major objective  of
reform programs. This is a fairly traditional objective  of privatization  programs everywhere. The
expected  efficiency  gains are divided into:  (1) productive efficiency--producing  the same or higher
levels uf output at lower cost; (2) X-efficiency--the  cluster of improvements  to be gained from better
organization,  management,  and motivation; (3) efficiencies  from escaping bureaucratic  regulation  and
indirect  management;  in most respects these are simply  a combination  of the improvements  available
under (1) and (2); and, finally (4) allocative  efficiency--resources  become employed  in their most
productive  and most valued uses, as prices reflect relative scarcities. A pivotal condition  for
allocative  efficiency  is the freedom  of enterprises  to enter dynamic and growing sectors and to exit
from declining  sectors or unprofitable  activities.
Most would agree that efficienc: gains from (1), (2), and (3) are likely to be substantial.
Socialist  cnt.erprises  are notoriously  inefficient  in their use of materials  and energy; the majority  suffer
from overmanning;  many are engaged in activities  that have little to do with their core business.
Economic  rationalization,  coupled with vigorous attention  to costs and profits, will considerably
improve  performance. These gains are likely to occur even if enterprises  remain monopolies  in
private hands or continue to operate in highly concentrated  sectors, for there will still be substantial
incentives  to reduce costs and increase profits.  The gains will certainly  be greater if firms are
exposed  to foreign competition.-'  !'
5/  Hinds (1989) is an eloquent expositor and proponent of this view; the editors of nTe Economist magazine are
converts; see the Survey article,  Perestroika.
6/  See van de Walle (1989) for a discussion of these objectives in the  context of developing economies.
7/  In an early study of Swedish industries, Carlsson (1972) found that even in highly concentrated sectors, firms
exposed to international competition showed strong improvement in productive and X-efficiency.  Scherer and
Ross (1990), pp. 648-54, review further evidence along these lines.
8/  In this regard the debates in market economies about privatization, which often swirl around comparisons of
efficiency and productivity between the private and public sectors, cannot be considered altogether relevant for
socialist economies.  To begin with, the scale of the problem is quite different:  in socialist economies, 70-90
percent (in terms of value added) is typically produced by state-owned enterprises, compared to 5 - 10 percent
in developed OECD  countries.  Second, publicly owned enterprises  in OECD  countries are  surrounded by
market-oriented enterprises, and they themselves operate in a commercial and legal enviromnent vastly different
from the coordinated, bureaucratic milieu of socialist enterprises.  Third, in developed economies much of the
public sector consists of  'natural'  monopolies;  in socialist economies the bulk of the State sector  consists of
potentially competitive industries where there is no presumption in favor of public ownership.4
The notion that allocative  efficiency  will be improved  by privatization  is more difficult  for some
to accept. Allocative  efficiency  is often considered  "more  a function  of market structure" than of
ownership. 2'  As expressed  by other analysts, "the degree of competition  typically [has] rather larger
effects..  .than own  .rship per se."n'° Stimulating  competition  by breaking  up monopolies  then
becomes an important  objective  in securing  overall efficiency  gains.  To put it differently, there is not
much allocative  improvement  to be found in turning "public" monopolies  into "private" ones.
It is arguable how far this view can be defended  in socialist settings. Gains in allocative
efficiency can only be achieved  when factors  of production  are free to move. By and large, this is
not the case now.  Labor is generally  immobile  due to structural reasons (such as lack of housing),
past policies of overmanning  and guaranteed  job security, and undifferentiated  wage structures.
Capital mobility  has been secured, in a manner of speaking,  through centrally  administered  allocations
of credit and redistributions  of tax revenues  from enterprise to enterprise, but the process has paid
little attention to efficiency  considerations. Most important, resources are locked in present uses
through  Lhe failure to enforce  bankruptcies.  If privatization allows for greater labor mobility, for
more efficient capital investing, and for release of resources through bankruptcies,  then gains in
allocative  efficiency  will be achieved  even with the continued  persistence  of monopolistic  or highly
concentrated  market structures. While this does not deny that further gains in allocative  efficiency
can be obtained by creating  competitive  market structures, it does suggest that the rationale for
breaking up monopolies  before privatizing  them may be less overwhelming  in socialist settings than in
market economies.
C.  Establishing  Democracy and Guaranteeing  Political Freedoms
The most openly ideological  intewest  in privatization  is the belief that economies  based on private
property are better at establishing  democratic  political institutions  and preserving  individual  freedoms
than economies  where the productive apparatus  is socially owned.@ 1 It can, of course, be debated at
some length whether  East and Central Europe's great extension  of State power from the economic  to
the civil realm was a necessary  concomitant  of the socialist system.  It can also be averred that not
always, and not everywhere,  have capitalist  economies  been stalwart defenders  of democracy  or
bastions of human freedom. These points are not conclusive  to radical reformers, who entertain  the
strong conviction  that only under systems  of extensive  private property do social meclianisms  arise to
limit the power of States through democratic  political arrangements.
This conviction  inspires the objective  of spreading  ownership  as widely  as possible: the wider
the spread, the greater the bulwark against  destruction  of the new and preferred political institutions.
Spreadinig  ownership also makes  destruction  of the new economic  system more difficult. As historical
episodes of nationalization  show, expropriation  does not raise major problems  when ownership  has
been conc.  ntrated among  the few.  Public  attitudes  are different when everyone is a property owner.
2/  Hemrnings  and Mansoor  (1988), p. 18.
10/  See Vickers  and Yarrow  (1988), p. 3.
11  /  'The system of private property is the most important  guarantee  of freedom, not only for those who own
property, bvt scarcely less for those who do not."  (}layek 1944, pp. 103-4.)  The idea has an illustrious
pedigree in the writings of, to name a few, Locke, Mill, and more recently Mises (1922), pp. 185-95,  and
Friedman  (1962). Schumpeter  (1943)  argued  that  democracy  was possible  under both socialism  and capitalism,
although  he further  suggested  that  a socialist  democracy  would,  because  of the controls  it would  need to exercise
over econormic  behavior, have less tolerance  for human freedoms.in addition, widespread  ownership  can be defended  from the point of view of another "primary"
value:  equality. A society with dispersed ownership  is likely, ceteris  paribus, to be more egalitarian
than one with concentrated ownership.L'5
D.  Increasing Government  Revenu
Privatization  is also viewed as a means  for raising government  revenues. Funds are raised
almost instantly  when the State reduces its subsidies  to inefficient  firms and sells their assets.
Revenues  are raised permanently  if the economy  moves to a higher growth path as a result of
privatization  and taxes are thus higher than they would otherwise  be.
The expectation  of permanently  increased  revenues is crucially dependent  upon privatization
improving  enterprise economic  performance. If we assume that ernterprises  are initially sold at their
value (equal to the discounted  sum of net future profits received  by the State), and that their
efficiency  remains the same after privatization,  then the State's long-term revenue position  does not
improve through sales.  All that happens is that the State exchanges  an earning asset (an enterprise)
for cash; it substitutes  further earnings  for present income.'3
During economic  crisis, with the need for fiscal stringency  and the possibility  of popular unrest,
it is understandable  that governments  will particularly  support the objective  of raising revenue through
privatization. Tnese revenues  can, after all, substitute in the short term for increased  taxes.  There
will, however, be macroeconomic  constraints  to be heeded.  If, for instance, privatization  is used to
retire a large monetary overhang,  then for the government  immediately  to return this purchasing
power to the economy  will be inflationary. The disposition  of revenues  cannot, in short, be
disassociated  from the immediate  macroeconomic  setting, nor can the long-term  establishment  of a
sustainable  fiscal system be permanently  postponed.
The objective  of raising revenues  through privati ation is not without further controversy. The
argument is often made that all assets that are socially owned should be distributed  free to citizens:
after all, they 'own" them in the first place, and it seems iiividious  to sell people something  they
already own.  This view is sometimes  coupled with a further suggestion  that the sale of assets is
likely, for e variety of reasons, to be so slow as to subvert the hoped-for  economic  gains that quick
and extensi  {e property ownership will provide. These arguments  are taken up in Section 111.
E.  The Inconsistency  of the Objectives
In the numerous episodes  of privatization  in other countries, inconsistency  in objectives  has often
been remarked upon.  Of Britain's privatization,  for instance, it has been observed:
12/  Samuel  Brittan  (1988), p. 300, has suggested  that the  distribution  of shares  in state-ownud  companies  could
represent  the first step toward giving each citizen  a guaranteed  minimum  income (derived  as the investment
income  from the 'citizen bundle' of shares). Dispersion  of ownership  would  thus be directly  combined  with
welfare policy.
13/  Revenues  from asset sales simply  represe.i  a transformation  of one form of State  property  (physical  assets) for
another  (cash). They should accordingly  be treated  as an asset exchange  similar  to a sale of bonds: in other
words, the conventional  deficit should  not be manipulated  to give a misleading  picture of the state of fiscal
fuiances.  For some reason, however, sale revenues in Britain reduce a most widely used measure of the
government  deficit--the  Public Sector  Borrowing  Requirement  (PSBR).6
At different times, each of these objectives--revenue,  efficiency, finance, wider share
ownership -- has been sacrificed  for others.  There has been no consistent  rationale  for the
pol!icy  of privatization;  rather, it has appeared  to meet particular political needs at particular
moments in time.  W
Certain inconsistencies  may also come into play in socialist privatization  programs.
Most pronounced  are likely to be conflicts  between  quick privatization--to  establish  the new
economic  and political systems rapidly--and  the objects  of raising revenue and increasing  efficiency.
As noted above, selling assets will take a long time; it would be much simpler and quicker to
distribute them free.  Moreover, if governments  decide to sell, it is expected  that the lower the prices,
the easier and more rapid the sales.  Sales can also be expedited,  against the grain of achieving
efficiency, by selling enterprises  as monopolies  or by offering tariff or tax concessions.
Increased  economic  efficiency  and dispersed ownership  may also pose difficulties. If ownership
is too dispersed, the link between  the share-owning  individual  and the performance  of the enterprise
would almost be as weak as in the previous (state-dominated)  system.  The failure of a single
dominant  owner to emerge might allow managements  consideraole  latitude  to perform inefficiently.
Some compromise  with the ideal of an egalitarian  "property-owning  democracy"  might then be
sought, accepting  a greater concentration  of ownership  and wealth in order to secure improved
economic  performance.-I'
There are probably  no "solutions"  to these inconsistencies,  since they are inherent in the nature
of the objectives  themselves. But governments  would do well to be aware of them in formulating
privatization  strategies.
11. THE ENVIRONMENT  FOR DIVESTITURE  IN REFORMING
SOCIALIST  ECONOMIES
Divestiture  of enterprises  is, at best, not easy.  In reforming socialist economies  the obstacles are
formidable;  viewed  from the outset, the process appears considerably  more complicated  than
divestitures  that have occurred in other parts of the world.  In this section we review some
complicating  factors and constraints  that both shape the debates about  ownership change  and
determine  the feasible actions available  to makers and implementers  of policy.
A.  Politics: The Actors
The Workers.  Industrial  workers in Hungary, Poland, and Yugoslavia  are insistent  that they
should at minimum  have an important  ownership  stake in the enterprises  where they have worked.W
The existence  of enterprise councils  giving workers a prominent  stake in decision-making  (Hungary
and Poland) and of self-management  (Yugoslavia)  has reinforced  this sentiment  at the plant level.  (In
14/  Bishop and Kay (1989), p.  643.
15/  Some privatization schemes explicitly acknowledge this problem as, for example, Kornai (1989).
16/  'Public opinion polls conducted in early 1989 showed that 67 percent of workers in medium-sized companies
and 41 percent in large companies favored private ownership.  However, only 22 percent of workers accepted
a takeover by investors not working in the company, while 47 percent were opposed.  Employee ownership bad
the overwhelming support of 71 percent of the polled."  (Walkowiak, Breitkopf, and Jaszczynski 1990, p.  79.)7
Czechoslovakia,  for a brief period between 1987  and 1989, workers also exercised a managerial  role
in enterprises.) Only in Poland have industrial  workers organized into national  trade unions'  been
capable of strongly entering the political arena.  National  organization  may not, however, be
necessary for workers to express their will.  Incidents  at enterprise  level--workplace  rnialfeasance,
strikes, or promised industrial conflict--would  be sufficient  to deter divestiture.
Workers, in some respects, have the most to lose from privatization. At the moment they
receive some proportion  of the residual enterprise income after fixed charges have been met; they can
often dictate how large that proportion  will be.  But in the future, workers will face lower real wages
and unemployment  through plant closures and redundancies. It seems inevitable,  therefore, that ways
must be found to include workers in the new property dispensation.
The Managers.  "Spontaneous  privatizations"  have affected  Hungary, Poland, and Yugoslavia.
The manifestations  have been various.  But they have generally involved  managers imaginatively
exploiting  loopholes  in the evolving  transformation  and ownership  legislation  so as to transfer
ownership  or use of enterprise assets to themselves--usually  at a fraction of real worth.  Managers
have also, on occasion, sold assets to foreigners  or incorporated  enterprises  as joint ventures with
foreign partners, making themselves  the major beneficiaries. The assets and sums involved  have not
been smallA'` Public outcry has been sharp and intense, not least because  these takeovers have been
engineered  through networks  of privileged  nomenklatura.
Government  officials know that procedures  for divestiture  must be transparent and fair, since
there is a potential for severe backlash if the public begins to equiate  privatization  with "rip-offs." At
the same time, the confidence  of managers must be retained if privatization  is to succeed.  Indeed,
one of the strongest engines of privatization  is to harness the self-interest  of managers in preparing
their firms for the private sector.-L' There is no alternative  managerial  elite waiting in the wings to
take over from incumbents. And like workers, managers  will want some equity stake in the firms
where they work. They will act to obtain it.
The Politicians. Privatization  in the reforming  socialist economies  is quintessentially  a political
phenomenon. It invokes debates  on profound questions  about the nature of a good society, and about
the kind of society reform should aim to achieve. The distribution  of wealth between individuals  and
between  classes, the relations of power between owners, managers, and workers--these  are two of the
more contentious  questions that arise in designing  the scope and rules of divestiture. To say that
privatization  is essentially  or even mainly a technical problem, where the chief difficulties  lie in lack
of markets and institutional  deficiencies,  appears  excessively  simple and unrealistic. Observation
suggests a very high degree of domestic  politicization  of these debates, as interests  clash and lobbies
compete for influence.
17/  OPZZ,  the  official Communist Trade  Union, and  Solidarity; OPZZ  has reportedly been gaining many new
members, eclipsing Solidarity membership in the process.
18/  For details of some of these occurrences see the papers by Walkowiak et al (1990), Madzar (1990), and Miszei
(1990).  In Hungary spontaneous transformations have touched the country's largest electric bulb manufacturer,
a  major producer of medical equipment, and one of the  largest producers of motor vehicles.  In  Poland the
largest agro-industrial firm has been taken over in a nomenklatura privatization.
19/  See  Alan  Walters,  'Privatization"  (mimeo),  on  the  importance  of  this  fact  for  the  British  privatization
experience.8
The new elites that are emerging generally  espouse  privatization  as the instrumental  remedy for
the failures of the socialist economic  model. The old elites, however discredited,  do not necessarily
agree.  It is hypothesized  here, however, that active  opposition  to privatization  from the old elites--
with their bases of support in the bureaucracy,  among managers, and in the armed forces--will  be
small.  Much more likely will be attempts  to use political and administrative  processes to turn
privatization  to their own advantage.
Those w  ho favor privatization,  while sharing a common  goal, do not always agree on the scope,
methods, or speed of the process. For the moment these differences  appear muted in a prevailing
atmosphere  of technocratic  setting of agenda. Witn a sharper crystallization  of party and group
affiliation  (as has occurred in Hungary)  these differences  can be expected  to be more prominent.  And
as privatization  gets into full swing, political pressures  from both potential  losers and potential
winners are likely to become intense. Likewise,  rent-seeking  or pressures for financial  and economic
privilege  or protection  by newly privatized  firms will be strong. These two latter features  have
complicated  divestiture  everywhere. The political management  of privatization  will then become a
major--if not the most important--conditioning  factor for the success of reform programs.
B.  The Legal Framework2'
One of the great challenges  facing reforming socialist economies  is to institute  a systematic  body
of law governing  the activities  of agents in a market economy. In addition, an entire judicial system
(courts, judges, lawyers, procedures, regulations)  has to be constructed  around the requirements  of
entering into and discharging  transactions in the market.  Simply  to list some of the needs is to gain
an appreciation  of the magnitude  of the task.
*  In many cases the constitution  needs to be amended  to eliminate  the considerable  proscriptions
on private property and private property rights.
*  Civil laws must be changed  to institute  resolution  of disputes in ordinary courts of justice
rather than through State arbitration, while adequate  mechanisms  for enforcement  of decisions
must be supplied.
*  Property rights have to be established  and relevant issues addressed--ownership,  titling,
transfer of property, succession,  nationalization,  expropriation,  and the like.
*  The body of commercial  laws, often dating back to the last century, needs to be brought up to
date.
*  The legal framework  for companies  and their operations--  registration, liability--must  be
codified in new or revised company  laws.
*  'llTe  legal frairework for restructuring, commercialization,  and ultimately  privatization  of
State enterprises must be established.
*  Bai  kruptcy laws must be instituted  and enforced.
*  Comipetition  legislation  and legislation  governing  mergers and acquisitions  must be addrcssed,
along with patent licensing, trader --ks, franchising,  and dumping.
*  As tax systems change  toward (mo,., likely) VAT and personal and corporate income tax
systems, so too must legislation  and administrative  regulations  be instituted.
*  The market economy  will require a separate and updated codification  of labor laws.
This list could go on to include  banking  laws, laws governing  capital markets and currency market
operations, the criminal code, and so on.
20/  This section draws heavily on a memorandum by 1. Newport.9
In privatization  legislation  three steps appear basic: first, establishing  clear ownet.  hip rights;
second, setting clear rules for transforming  enterprises  into joint siock companies  (and other forms of
company  organization);  third, establishing  clear and transparent  procedures  for privatization.
Hungary  provides an example  of how difficult even this may be.
Hungary  has perhaps marched farthest down the path of creating a legal framework  for
privatization  through the passage of Company  Law in 1988 a'nd  a Transformation  Law in 1989.
These estab;ish  the basis for transforming  State enterprises  and cooperatives  into joint stock or limited
liability companies. This legislation  is seen, in many quarters, as being flawed, in that the Company
Law failed to establish unambiguously  the ownership  rights of either the State or natural persons.
Instead it appears  to have devolved  ownership  to the enterprise itself, in effect "denationalizing"  State
assets Pnd  further sanctioning  self-management.I' With the Trai.sformation  Act of 1989, the legal
position  became sufficiently  tangled to allow  spontaneous  privatizations.
'rhis example  highlights  how privatization  legislation  is, in fact, the substantive  reflection of
political positions and interests. The creation  of enterprise councils  and the granting of de facto rights
of self-management  in previous years had created resistance  to 're-nationalization,"  which was
perceived  as a return to the bad ol . days of administration  from the center.  The same tensions can be
observed in the ongoing debates on Polish  privatization  (Poland introduced  workers' councils in
1981). Clearly, unless basic issues  are resolved  early in the life cycle of legislation,  privatization
efforts can quickly run aground.
C.  Enterrise  Readiness  for Privatization
A considerable  constraining  factor in privatizing  is tc ensure that enterprises  are in reasonably
healthy condition  and will, in private hands, contribute  to the overall objectives  of the privatization
program.  Several actions are necessary  before enterprises  in socialist economies  are let go to the
private sector.  These include  demonopolization,  enterprise  valuation, and more generally  enterprise
restructuring.
D.  Demononolization
As noted earlier, socialist economies  are highly monopolized;  the average size of firms is
considerably  higher than in industrial  economies. Socialist  planning  deliberately  engineered  this
industrial  structure, for it minimized  the span of coordination  and purportedly  encouraged  economies
of scale.  Enterprises  are large, however, not simply  because  they are the sole supplier  or one of few
sources of products.  Many enterprises  have absorbed all manner of ancillary  functions  and
businesses;  a number of service functions  have been internalized  because  of the uncertainties in
manner of relying on outside suppliers.  Most firms have extensive  internal  patterns of cross-
subsidization  that, given the poor state of accounts,  are extraordinarily  difficult  to disentangle.
Breaking  up large firms before selling  them will not be simple.  Multiple  operations  producing
the same product  at different geographical  locations  and with few economies  of scale are an easy
target.  Most enterprises are far more complex  than this.  Distinguishing  economies  of scale and
scope in enterprise organization,  identifying  the precise organizational  components  generating
monopoly  structure, assessing  the compass  of efficient  vertical integration  within firms, and devising
plans for effective  breakup will require considerable  technical  expertise. A single-minded  ae'.-ition to
demonopolization  will thus almost certainly  delay privatization.
21D See Mizsei  (1990). Self-management  was instituted  through a State Enterprise  lAw in 1984.10
For this reason, some corimentators  argue that the "monopoly"  problem should be initially
ignored. Policy should be aimed less at demonopolization  than at preventing the abuses of dominant
positions. discouraging  collusion, and ensuring  no unfair or illegal barriers to entry.  A difficulty with
this position is that the pursuit of uncompetitive  practices  after divestiture  will add to the uncertainty
of the environment  into which firms are divested and where they must operate.
As noted earlier, most of the firms to be divested  are not "natural" monopolies  and are
potentially  competitive. Liberalized  external  trade is the primary force that will introduce competition
into the economy  and exercise price and quality discipline;  indeed, there are a number of studies
demonstrating  the superiority for growth and welfare of an open rather than inward-looking
orientation.  While liberalized  trade is undoubtedly  to be recommended  over the medium term, it is
not clear that the countries with external difficulties  and deep debt burdens (Bulgaria, Hungary,
Poland) have the wherewithal  to secure effective  import penetration  and competition  any time soon.
E.  Valuation
At what price should enternrises  be sold? The value of a firm is often taken to be the discounted
value of future after-tax net earnings. In conditions  of highly distorted prices - both for outputs and
inputs--it  might appear that attempting  correct valuation  is chasing  a chimera. It might even be
questioned  how valuable the exercise is, since in other countries  public enterprises  have been offered
at discounts  from market values.='  In reforming  socialist  economies,  great uncertainties  about
demand conditions,  the business environment,  the CMEA, and the like will make deep discounts
inevitable. Nonetheless,  correct valuation  is important  both as a matter of fairness to prospective
investors  and as a way to ensure that the State cannot  be accused  of "giving away" the national
patrimony.
The rationale  for valuation is often explained  in terms of informational failures and asymmetries
that the State should try to correct.  Only those close to the enterprise (managers, workers, and some
civil servants) with some knowledge  of its capacities  and markets are able to make an informed  guess
as to its future in a reformed economy. For reasons of fairness to other citizens  and potential
investors, this information  should be made available  to all.  Public confidence  in the privatization
program can be quickly eroded if it appears that massive  windfalls  are accruing to purchasers with
inside  knowledge  and through initial underpricing. (Recently  the Hungarian  courts stopped the sale of
a hotel chain due to underpricing.) In effect, the case for attempting  sensible--or  at least defensible-
valuations  appears strong.
Several methods  have been proposed  to obtain these valuations. The first is to consider  setting
up stock maijkets. This approach  has its problems. First, establishing  stock markets does not
eliminate  the need to establish an initial price for an enterprise  (that is, a valuation). Second, the
belief that stock markets will actually  establish "cerrect" valuation  is, as Keynes suggested long ago, a
myth: stock markets are locales for equity  trading, for mounting  battles for control, and for financial
speculation. The extraordinary  gyrations  of stock prices in recent years should give automatic  pause
22/  The British and French experiences  are well-known  Ln  this regard.  The share rrices of Bristish  Petroleum,
Bristish  Airways,  and Rolls-Royce  rose some  33-36  percent  on the first  day of trading  after divestiture  (Vickers
and Yarrow  1988,  p. 175). In France, the largest  two  privatizations  (St. Gobain  and Paribas),  the discount  was
between  20-25  percent. It has been estimated  that both in the British  and French cases the revenue  foregone
by the privatizations  amnounted  to about 10 percent  of the gross proceeds  (Jenkinson  and Mayer 1988,p. 487).11
to anyone suggesting  that stock markets establish  enterprise  values.22'  A second suggestion  is that
the whole issue be finessed by simply valuing  firms at their book value, perhaps corrected  for
inflation. A third suggestion  is to "price" the capital stock of enterprises  at replacement  value
through international  comparisons  and, with further guesswork, prepare plausible estimates. This
method may buy respectability  and may, in the absence  of anything better, serve the purpose.  But it
will be expensive  (and probably  enrich a number of investment  bankers), and it will take a long time
to accomplish. The conclusion  must be that there is no canonical  method to provide precise,
objective  answers  to the valuation  problem.>'
F.  EnterMrise  Restructuring
That many enterprises in reforming socialist  economies  require restructuring is undoubted. But
the magnitude  of the restructuring  problem is unknown. Indeed, it cannot be known until
macroeconomic  reforms (price liberalization,  exchange  rate convertibility,  changes  in tax systems,
removal of subsidies, reform in the CMEA) work their way through enterprise income statements  and
balance  sheets.  The presumption  must be that the problem is large.
There is a major question  whether enterprises  should be restructured  before being  privatized  or
whether  restructuring should be left to the new, private owners. If the State sells unrestructured
enterprises, it will undoubtedly  receive  less revenue. ThIs may not matter much, for it is extremely
unlikely  that governments  can recoup the restructuring  investments  they make to prepare enterprises
for private sale.  In passing on restructuring  problems  to the new private owners, the State will pass
on problems it has no particular expertise in solving. To create that expertise-and there are
considerable  doubts that a government  body should even try-would require the establishment  of a
large and specialized  administration.
An emerging  conventional  wisdom suggests:Z'
*  Physical  and technical  restructuring is best left to the purchaser, who will do it better and
more cheaply than the State; the purchase  price should be discounted  accordingly.
*  Labor and management  retrenchment  is best handled  by the State prior to sale; this invariably
conflictual  dimension  of restructuring is too politically  difficult  to leave to new owners.
*  Financial  restructuring  should be left to the private owner but almost always requires heavy
State involvement. By and large, the State absorbs  the enterprise debt and otherwise  assists in
cleaning up balance  sheets.
23/  For further  evidence  on this point  see Shiller  (1981  and 1989). Nobel  Laureate  James  Tobin, in citing  evidence
for errors in narket valuations,  comments:  'I think  developing  and ex-communist  countries  should  go slow in
copying  the fuiancial  institutions  of the United States and the United  Kingdom,  or of Japan for that natter.
When I read that Wall Streeters  are visiting  Beijing  to help the People's Republic  establish  a stock market, I
shudder. It is far from clear that the proliferation  of ftnancial  instruments,  market  arbitrage  opportunities,  and
paper transactions  in advanced  countries has created social product  to justify the high-quality  human  capital
resources  it devours." Tobin (1990), p. 233.
.4/  Durupty  (1988), p. 66, provides an example  in the case of Paribas Bank.  Different formns  of valuation  and
different  consultants  came up with a range of values from FF17.6 billion  and FF21.5 billion--a  difference  in
excess  of 20 percent. The fnal value chosen  by the Privatization  Committee  was FF17.5  billion.
25/  This section  draws on a comment  by J. Nellis.12
The notion that there is a cadre of available  owners capable  of initiating  and managing  major
restructurings  needs to be proven correct.  It is precisely  a lack of faith that such a cadre exists that
leads Kornai to argue for a somewhat  slower pace of privatization.'
Restructuring  requires skill, expertise, financial  capital, and time.  In Hungary, industrial
restructuring  has been ongoing since 1986-87  with the help of IBRD financing  and technical
assistance. It is too early to report on progress, although  some success stories appear in the making.
In Poland, there is discussion  about forming a government-sponsored  restructuring  agency as well as
a separate bank to take equity positions  in companies  about  to be restructured. A special
'restructuring  levy" is imposed  on all firms to provide financing.
G.  The Financial Environment
The lack of well-developed  capital markets is often seen as one of the most serious constraints  to
wholesale, quick divestiture  of enterprises  in East and Central Europe.  The problem has many
elements.
First, savings appear too small to purchase  more than a fraction of the capital stock.  Total
private money savings in Poland are sufficient  to buy 5 percent of enterprise  assets at book value. 2 '
In Hungary, it has been suggested  that "at present rates of domestic savings, it would take Hungarians
hundreds of years to purchase  all State enterprises.  "a'
Second, throughout  the region, banking  systems are weak and underdeveloped. Two-tier
banking  systems are just emerging;  competition  between banks is limited; there are substantial
problems  of bad debts, arrears, portfolio difficulties,  and mismatches  between  assets and liabilities.
Household  and enterprise credit circuits are far from well-integrated. There are very few specialized
financial intermediaries. Merchant  banks, which might advise enterprises  on privatization  strategies,
do not exist.  Banking  systems, in short, suffer from such deep-seated  financial  difficulties-and are in
such early stages of institutional  and professional  development-that they cannot contribute  to the
privatization  process to the same degree as elsewhere.
Third, only Hungary has a stock market.  It lists about 40 companies  and has a capitalization  of
some $116 million (1989)--about  0.5 percent of GDP.22' It meets infrequently  and-obviously--little
gets traded; most shares are traded over the counter. There are no brokers, underwriters, institutional
investors, or large money holders.22'
Financial  underdevelopment  thus appears  to place a serious constraint  upon the quick sale of
enterprises  at prices approximating  anything  like their "real" values.  One position  is clearly to
26/  Kornai  1989).
27/  Reported in Walkowiak et al (1990), p.  71.
28/  Quoted in the report of the Blue Ribbon Commission (1990), p.  21.
29/  In Japan, capitalization is 150 percent of GDP.  Some other figures are:  Switzerland 110 percent, Britain 100
percent,  United States 65 percent,  France 35 percent, W.  Germany 31 percent,  Italy 22 percent.  (From The
Economist, Capitalism, Survey, May 5,  1990, p.  8.)
30/  Reference from Tle International Economy, April/May 1990, p. 69; Blona  Hardy "Eastern Europe's First Test
Case.'13
recognize  this, along with the other inhibiting  factors, and to accept a slow, careful privatization
process in which shares releases are commensurate  with the ability of households,  investors, and other
potential  owners to absorb the issue. The process can  be calibrated roughly to the strengthening  of
the banking  system, the establishment  of stock markets, the development  of specialized  financial
instruments,  and the growth of domestic  savings.
Paradoxically,  on the other hand, a rapid privatizatio0.  process is sometimes  regarded as a
mechanism  for the quick development  of capital  markets and in particular securities markets. It is
argued  that issuing securities for sale would  draw out much presently  unrecorded foreign exchange
holdings, including expatriated  holdings. Purchase  of the securities, moreover, could be financed
through expansion  of earmarked credit.  (For an evaluation  of credit expansion  as a mechanism  for
facilitating  purchases see Section  Ill.)  This view does not, unfortunately,  meet all objections.
An important  constraint lies also in prudent public disclosure  requirements  that publicly listed
firms provide quantitative  data and facts about their performance. In reforming  socialist economies,
few firms are presently  capable  of producing  such data; acceptable  accounting  standards have yet to
be established, and the accountancy  and auditing professions  are in their infancy. As a result,
securities  could be quickly  created in great quantities-but the lack of public information  on
enterprises  would render security trading meaningless  and potentially  open to manipulation,  fraud, and
other abuses.
H.  The Fiscal Environment
The difficulties  to successful  privatization  provided  by unreformed  fiscal systems is one of the
least appreciated  constraints. Virtually all reforming socialist  economies  inherit a system of turnover
taxes, company (profit)  taxes, and taxes on wages that together comprise  the most important  sources
of revenue.A' These taxes have been levied at enterprise-specific  rates designed  to affect the prices
of goods and services and to facilitate  redistributions  of income between  enterprises. The collection
of taxes has been accompanied  by numerous  ad hoc interventions  and by bargaining between
enterprises  and ministries. Taxes have rarely been set with a view to improving  efficiency  or
enhancing  growth.
This is not a propitious  environment  in which to privatize.  The State's need to raise revenue
may conflict with the absolute need to relinquish  discretionary  power over enterprise income.  This
tension  will be heightened  during the transition  phase, for the State's revenue requirements  will
increase (to finance social assistance  programs)  even as it must establish  clear, consistent,  and
nonarbitrary  tax rules.  Moreover, setting tax rates at high enough levels to meet revenue targets may
well conflict with the desirability  of providing  incentives  for savings, investment,  and work effort.
As firms are privatized, and as the private sector grows in size, a major administrative  effort will be
required to levy, assess, and collect taxes.
The overall fiscal impact  of privatizations  cannot  be predicted in advance. While privatizations
will bring in revenue in the short term, they will also signal the loss of dividends  that the State has
been implicitly  collecting  under various tax guises.  Governments  may no longer need to pay
subsidies  to privatized firms, but there may be short-term  expenditures  entailed in cleaning  up
enterprise  balance sheets before divestiture. Furthermore,  there may be substantial  short-term costs in
31/  Hungary  is the  only country to have implemented a  VAT and personal and corporate  income tax  systemns.
Poland proposes to introduce these taxes in 1991.14
providing  severance payments  and unemployment  compensation. Short-term  losses, in fact, may need
to be covered  by general taxation.
1.  The Administrative  Environment
Implicit in much said above is the absence  of administrative  and institutional  capacity  to conduct
privatizations. Virtually every survey of experiences  in developing  countries  points to lack of
implementation  capacity and of developed  financial  markets as the major bottleneck  in
privatization.A In reforming socialist economies,  the requirements  for administrative  initiatives
extend well beyond a narrow privatization  focus; they entail changing  legal frameworks  and the fiscal
system, establishing  demonopolization  and restructuring  capacity,  and developing  financial  systems.
The challenge is massive.
To stimulate  and orchestrate  privatizations,  some countries  appear to be opting for the
establishment  of privatization  offices with a degree of parliamentary  oversight. In Hungary, a State
Privatization  Agency was established  in 1990. Such an agency appears  to be the intent in the latest
draft of Poland's privatization  law.
111. TYPOLOGY  OF PRIVATIZATION:
ADVANTAGES  AND DISADVANTAGES  OF DIFFERENT  OPTIONS
The various proposals advanced  for privatizing  the large State sectors of socialist economies  can be
classified by their answers  to two basic questions:
- Should the assets be given away free or should  the enterprises  be sold?
*  To whom should the assets be given or sold?
There are several groups of possible recipients. The list includes:
*  "Inside owners"--workers  and managers  specific to an enterprise.
*  All private individuals.
(1)  Domestic  citizens.
(2)  Foreign citizens.
*  Institutions.33
(1)  Banks  and other financial  institutions.
(2)  Holding companies.
(3) Pension funds.
(4) Universities, charities, and other worthy causes.
(5) Regional and local governments.
32/  See  van  de Walle  (1989),  Kikeri  (1990),  Hanke  (1988)  for reviews  as well  as citations  for further  references.
33/  Institutions  will ultimately,  of course, be owned  either by individuals  or by governments. If the former they
could  be subsumed  as a subset  of 'individual  ownership."  However,  because  institutional  ownership  brings
different  characteristics  to the process  of privatization  and potentially  to the control  of managers  after
privatization,  it is treated  as a separate  category  here.i5
The various combinations  of answers to the two questions  provide  the universe of discussion.
Table 1 attempts  to put order to this discussion  by identifying  the main options.
In Table 1 we divide privatizations  essentially  into two types, internal  and external, according  to
the target group of the privatization  procedure.
In internal  privatization,  shares are given or sold exclusively  to  workers and/or managers
employed in a firm, perhaps including  those who have worked there in the past.  Giving or selling
enterprises  to employee  groups could occur rapidly or slowly.  Employees,  for instance, could acquire
shares gradually: first borrowing  the money to buy shares and then effectively  acquiring them as the
credit is repaid (the Employee  Stock Ownership  Plan [ESOPI model). There may be restrictions on
the transfer of the shares.  If shares have to remain with the work force, the model is  that of a
cooperative  (or partnership)  or a 100 percent employee-owned  ESOP.
In external privatization,  shares are given away or sold to individuals  or groups that extend
beyond the firm's boundaries. Bidders for an enterprise could comprise  all private persons,
institutions, and foreign investors. In this form of privatization,  maximal  holdings may initially be
posited for particular groups (such as foreign investors, internal  managers)  for reasons of policy.
Conversely, minimal  holdings might also be posited  (for the internal  enterprise work force, for the
population  at large) for reasons of fairness or in order to spread both shareholdings  and potential
capital gain to as many people as possible.  At the same time, secondary  trading is encouraged in
order to allow for the eventual  emergence  of majority  owners or controlling  interests.
Table 1.  TARGET GROUPS  OF DIFFERENT  TYPES OF PRIVATIZATION
INTERNAL  EXTERNAL
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If enterprises are to be given away free, then two important  cases of external  privatization  occur.
Fiest, free distribution  to the whole population, and second, distribution  to institutions, of which the
most talked about option is distribution  to holding companies. Holding companies  introduce an
additional  step to the privatization  process because, initially, enterprises  are allocated  to them.  In turn
they are expected  later to bring the enterprises  to market and sell them to private individuals. Shares
in holding companies  themselves  may initially  be given away, sold, or held by the state.
Each individual  privatization  may be, in effect, a combination  of different privatization  types.
For example, 50 percent of an enterprise could be sold to the highest bidders, 30 percent distributed
to all citizens, and 20 percent given away to employees. In this section we shall review  briefly the
main advantages  and disadvantages  of different privatization  options.  In doing so, we make use of a
limited set of criteria to frame the discussion. Specifically  we ask of the various models  how they
perform with respect to:
*  Fairness.
*  Speed of privatization.
*  Monitoring  and control of managerial  performance.
3  Revenue raising.
A.  Internal privatization
Advantages. The main advantages  of internal  privatization  are that it is administratively  easy to
implement, can be quite rapid, and is popular at least among workers in successful  enterprises. They
will own their enterprises  and to that extent become masters  of their fates.  There is a general
presumption  that partly or fully employee-owned  firms should  be more productive  than firms owned
by outsiders, as employees  will share directly in the increased profits from more intense  effort.-
Moreover, if the later market price of the company  becomes  substantially  higher than the price at
which the shares were acquired (which may often be zero) then, provided the shares can be sold to
outsiders, strong capital gains may potentially  be made.  Administratively,  problems of
implementation  are minimal: workers need to agree on a formula whereby  shares will be distributed
(for example, if pensioners or those who worked before in the firm would also receive some) and
whether shareholding  will be open to outsiders and under what conditions.'  The transformation
process may be spontaneous,  with employees  deciding more or less unilaterally  to go private.  The
State's involvement  may be minimal, other than setting a purchase  price, as the modalities  of the
process are determined  by employees  alone.
Disadvantages. The most general problems with internal  privatization  were succinctly  stated by
Polish Minister  of Industry  Tadeusz Syryjczyk:3&
What can be said to the argument  that an enterprise  belongs to its workers? That farmers,
who tlrough a long period carried the burden of industrialization,  do not now have any
right to national  capital? And teachers and doctors? That a young man who works in a
34/  Whether in fact this is the case is largely an empirical matter.  For a comprehensive review of the evidence,
for a number of developed mnarket  economies, see the set of essays in A. Blinder (1990).
35/  In  some  privatizations  envisaged  in  Poland  (see  Walkowiak,  Breitkopf,  and  Jaszczynski  1990,  p.  67),
shareholding would be open to external investors but each of their shares would be worth one vote, while shares
held by the employees could carry two or three votes.
361  Quoted in Baczynski (1990).17
factory for one year has a greater right to shares than a pensioner  who worked in the same
factory for 30 years.  If this idea were put into practice, workers of rich enterprises  would
acquire huge capital, and others nothing.
In short, the procedure is highly  unjust and inegalitarian: it excludes  the general population,
which has a claim to the entirety  of national  assets; it further discriminates  between  the employees  of
profitable  and nonprofitable  firms.
In practice, there has been a form of internal  privatization  in some of the spontaneous
privatizations  in Hungary and Poland, where a subset of employees-managers-have taken over
ownership and control of firms.  It is argued that managers, in taking the firms private, have
manipulated  workers into losing potential income  of which they may have been unaware. If
management  tightly controls employees, it can ensure by bribery or coercion that they accept a
privatization  proposal favorable to management. No other group exists to protect the interests  of the
firm or to try to maximize  the price at which it is sold.  Features such as these have led to the
administrative  halt of internal  privatizations  in Poland, and to the decision of the Hungarian
Parliament  to establish  the Fund for State Property.  The  role of the Fund is to watch over possible
cases of fraudulent  privatization  and, if necessary,  to overrule some purchases.
It should be noted that the inequity  and inadvisability  of internal  privatization  only refers to
using it as a first stage privatization  strategy. If enterprises  are privatized  through processes  with
greater respect for distributional  justice, there appears little reason why managers  or workers or both
should not be allowed to engage in buy-outs. Judging from the experience  in other countries, if
shares are freely transferable, enterprises  may eventually  become externally  owned  joint stock
companies.3' Management  buy-outs  have also become a feature of a number of capitalist
economies,  particularly the U.S., in the last decade.  An advantage  is that they do establish  a
coincidence  of interests between managers  and owners.
A third difficulty  with internal  privatization  is that it will generate  lower revenue for the State
treasury  than selling shares in an open market.  In the interest of quick privatization-one of the main
attractions  of internal privatization-the State may agree upon share prices lower than a more careful
and slow process of enterprise valuation  would yield.W 2'
37/  French experience, quoted in Uvalic (1989), pp. 47-48, suggests tl- t workers tend to sell shares very quickly.
For example, during 1982 privatizations around 10 percent of shares of a dozen large companies were reserved
for employees.  Most of the shares were bought by the management.  Employees bought theirs principally for
speculative reasons (to realize capital gains) and sold them quickly.  The same seems to have been the case in
the UK:  the number of shareholders in British Aerospace passed from over 150,000 at the first day of quotation
to 27,000  less than a year later (Santini 1986, p.  42).  This gives an implied annual attrition of shareholders of
87 percent.  For a few other privatizations (Amersham, British Gas, British Telecom, and British Airways) the
attrition rates ranged between  12 and 75 percent p.a.  (Milanovic 1989, p.  166).
38/  See the Economist, Survey, May 5,  1990, for a recent discussion of the U.S. phenomenon.
39/  In some cases of  management buy-outs in Hungary,  money paid for shares became part of  net assets of  the
company.  The effect was that the new owners simply received their  firms as a  gift.  To understand  this,
suppose that the original value of a firm's  assets is $100.  If a 20 percent purchase of shares of the firm - worth
$20 - becomes the property of the firm, the firm will now be worth $120.  But since the purchaser now owns
20 percent of the firm, he has in effect assets worth $24 - the original investment plus a net gain of $4.  For
somebody who buys the whole firm, the entire value of the ftrm is a present.  That possibility seems also to
have been opened by the Yugoslav Law on Sociai Cug.ital  (December 1989) in case of non-100 percent purchases
of firms.18
B.  External  Privatization--Giveaway  to All Domestic  Citizens
Advantages. The very great appeal of giving assets to people is that it is egalitarian. If properly
conducted, no special group with access to money, credit, or power can exercise untoward influence
in cornering the nation's wealth. It is also the simplest  formula:  it dispenses  with arguments  about
any individual's  past contribution  to the buildup  of the nation's or enterprise's wealth. It enfranchises
all citizens  with property and thus creates the political stake in the system that makes the reform
program less likely to be derailed or reversed. Most important,  compared  to the alternatives, giving
assets to the citizenry is considered  one of the swifter ways of establishing  the private property basis
of a market economy  and the capital market.
Disadvantages. Free distribution  of shares, by definition,  implies zero revenue for the State.
Furthermore, it is sometimes argued  that people do not value what is given to them for free.
Distributing  shares in this way fails to allow markets  to perform their signalling function  of bringing
forward individuals  truly interested  in owning firms and prepared to risk their own financial capital in
the expectation  that they can earn substantial  returns."'
In a sense, this latter proposition  is a variant of a familiar  principal-agent  problem that
characterizes  this model.  The highly dispersed  ownership  entailed in free distribution  effectively
means  that there is no dominant owner (the principal)  to monitor and control the actions of managers
(the agents). Monitoring  costs to small individual  shareholders  are high compared to the minor loss
of income if managers  don't perform as well as they should. This problem is not peculiar to
reforming socialist economies;  indeed, it has been analyzed  in considerable  depth for advanced,
indi'strialized  countries with well-developed  financial systems. Partial solutions to the problem are
found in giving managers  bonuses and other incentives  tied to firm performance. In addition, stock
markets reputedly monitor enterprise  performance. Poor performance  is reflected in low share
quotations,  and managers  who fail to deliver find that their enterprises are targets for takeover-and
their own  jobs are at risk."'
This analysis  may bear some truth in advanced  market economies. But in reforming socialist
economies,  the wholesale  giving away of shares will allow managers  an inordinate  amount of power
in the short term.  Stock markets will take time to become established  and to develop the
sophistication  to police and discipline  bad managements. Of course, as shares are traded, individual
investors who might originally  have wished  to own a particular  enterprise will have an opportunity  of
doing so through share purchases. Given the initial low stocks of personal wealth, share
concentration  is likely to take time unless it is financed  through borrowing.  Thus there is the further
possibility  that the individuals  most likely to engineer leveraged  buy-outs of enterprises  are the
managers  themselves.
Distributing  shares to the population  for free is sometimes  regarded as disadvantageous  because
of the potential wealth effects upon consumption. These may be particularly unwelcome  if they occur
when economies  are simultaneously  undertaking  stabilization  programs.  However, the problem may
be reduced if the equity distribution  is paced so as not inordinately  to shift consumption  upward in the
short term.
40/  This is the substance of Kornai's  recent criticism of giveaways.
41/  For a somewhat negative recent assessment of the effectiveness of the "battle for corporate control," see Adams
and Brock (1989).19
While it is generally assumed  that wholesale  distribution  of shares could be done fairly easily,
few detailed plans have yet been provided  by proponents. In fact, the process could prove
administratively  d'fficult and costly. There are the daunting problems  of registering all eligible
prospective  shareholders. Shares will need to be "issued"  for each enterprise for distribution. An
extraordinary  distributional  effort will be required.  And a trading locus will need to be established
for the shares.
Several schemes  for packaging share distribution  have been developed. The first is to bundle
fractional  ownership in all firms in multiunit  shares that are then given  to everyone. Thus each
multiunit "supershare" is a composite  fractional  ownership  claim on every firm in the economy.
Dividends are paid on aggregate  enterprise  profitability. The concept appears  to have little merit.  If
everyone  owns everything  then, in effect, no one owns anything. Stock markets can hardly be
formed on this basis; shares will need to be unbundled  into their components.
A second scheme consists less in equal distribution  than in equal entitlement  for people to bid for
enterprises. Vouchers ("monopoly"  money, capital  tickets) are issued to all eligible citizens; these are
then used for bidding. A citizen may, for instance, use all his million  vouchers to bid for the shares
of one firm--or he may bid over several firms.  Bidding  in this way establishes  "voucher  unit"
enterprise valuation; as sales are consummated  (vov^hers  exchanged  for shares), ownership is
established. The drawbacks are several.  There will be strong informational  asymmetries  between
potential  purchasers, and between  potential  purchasers and the managers/workers  of specific
enterprises, as to which are the profitable  firms.  Bidding  for most is likely to be guided as much  by
speculation  and rumor as anything  else.  If many companies  are offered at once, a very uneven
distribution in bids may emerge, leaving some enterprises  available  for very little.  Bidding  for utility
stocks, for instance, may be high, leaving few vouchers to bid for perfectly  good firms.  Quite
exceptional  windfall  gains may result.  Both these  disadvantages  speak to a lack of consequential
fairness in what starts out as an egalitarian  move.
A third scheme is not to distribute  the shares directly, or through bidding, to the population.
Rather, it involves  giving enterprise shares to holding companies  and then distributing  the holding
company  shares to eligible  citizens. In this way each citizen participates  in a mutual fund.  Because
of its particular institutional  features, this model is evaluated  later in this section.
C.  External Privatization  - Sales to Individuals
Advantag.  The primary advantage  of external  privatization  via sales is that it allows the State
to collect money through sale of enterprises  at realistic prices. Taking the existing  distribution  of
income as given, the model also allows for an optimum allocation  of shares since, as for any other
goods, they are purchased  by those willing to pay the most.  The purchase  of firms by interested
individuals  precisely identifies  those most likely to exercise ownership  functions, particularly  the
monitoring  of managerial  performance. Once the State has established  a reservation  price for shares,
sale could be mounted  rather expeditiously  through auctions. External privatization  is fundamentally
open to anyone.
Disadvantag,s. Unfortunately,  the wide variety of constraints  outlined in Section It above,
inhibiting  the divestiture  of State assets, come into full play in the sale option. The process is likely
to be egregiously  slow.
The difficulties  lie both in the condition  of enterprises  to be privatized  and in the environment
into which they are privatized; dearth of information,  lack of liquidity, and underdevelopment  of
financial markets are the most prominent deficiencies. Given these problems, the State is faced with a
choice: speed the "sale" of enterprises  by accepting  depressed prices and releasing unready firms to20
the market, or crawl through a slow, steady process of valuation, restructuring, and marketing. The
latter course may prove politically  unacceptable.
A further general problem with sale to individuals  is that the existing  distribution of wealth will
ultimately  determine who buys shares and consequently  the future concentration  of ownership.
Present wealth concentration  is considered  by many  to be flawed. They argue that well-off people are
not "socially deserving," either because  they were too closely  associated  with the previous
undemocratic  regime or because  they have made their money  through foreign exchange  deals,
smuggling,  or other semilegal  or illegal activities. There are deep suspicions  of foreign exchange
caches held abroad by members  of the nomenklatura. Such people, the argument goes, should not be
allowed to "launder" ill-gotten  gains and become respectable  businessmen. Quite apart from the
equity concerns  are additional questions  as to whether, in fact, such individuals  or groups are likely to
make "good" owners.  Their professional  backgrounds  predispose  them to seeking special privileges
from the State rather than to competing  in the marketplace.40
Since "nonworthy"  groups are also likely to realize capital gains (from the initial underpricing  or
mispricing  of assets), the equity implications  of external  privatization  may be--according  to this view--
further flawed.4'  The real problem is whether  the distribution  of capital gains is done in
accordance with the distribution  of wealth. There may be good reasons to believe that it should not
be.  The fact that capital gains will indeed accrue to the rich segment  of the population, and that
concentration  of wealth will increase, is a serious argument  against selling as the only form of
privatization. It is certainly an argument in favor of blending external  privatization  with other forms
of privatization  (say, distribution  of shares to workers).4'
One mechanism  for getting around some of these problenis is to give the population  bank credit
that may then be used to purchase shares. This seeks to speeed  the process of divestiture  by
circumventing  institutional  and market deficiencies. Since there is often confusion  as to how this kind
of scheme might work, it is worth some discussion:
(1)  In its simplest form the proposal suggests  a massive  expansion  of bank notes earmarked  for
one specific purpose - to buy equity in enterprises. These bank notes are first given  or
credited to individuals. Once the equity purchases  have been made, the money is either
returned to the Central Bank or the notes are given to the goverriment  for spending. This is
obviously  tantamount  to a giveaway  of enterprises;  the bank notes have simply been
vouchers to exchange  for ownership  rights.  If the Central Bank sterilizes  the receipts, the
42/  Reported in Milor (1990).
43/  For the first eight French privatizations (up to May 1987), capital gains accrued disproportionately to better-off
households.  While only 2 percent of low-income French households bought shares, the proportion among top-
income groups was 30 percent (Durupty 1988, p.  114).
44/  This blend appears in the latest draft of  the Polish Law on Privatization, which would combine external and
internal privatizations with the former being dominant.  The law stipulates that once an enterprise is transformed
into a joint-stock company it must sell at  least 50 percent of  its shares within two years to third (external)
parties.  However,  20  percent of  shares will be  sold on a  preferential  basis to workers.  Kawalec (1989)
sirnilarly suggests in his proposal that workers be given 10 percent for free or at a nominal fee.21
story ends there.  If the bank notes are given to the government,  then not only have
households  obtained enterprises  for free but the government  has money  to spend. 45'
(2)  Instead  of bank notes to buy equity, individuals  and households  could  be offered loans.
(This is the proposal of the Blue Ribbon Commission  in Hungary.) The Central Bank could
engineer a massive  expansion  of credit to households  and individuals  through banks or a
specialized  intermediary. Once again the credit would be earmarked  only for buying equity.
The proceeds  of sale could be frozen by the Central Bank or, more likely, be appropriated
by the government. The chief difference  between  this example  and the earlier one is that
households  and individuals  have acquired  a liability--their  bank loans--whi^h  they must
repay out of future income.
In this respect the borrowers  do genuinely  buy title to the ownership  claim. A difficulty  with
this scheme may be, however, that few individuals  or households  will have appropriate
collateral. Proponents  argue that the equities bought could serve as collateral. The effect,
however, is to shift all risk to the financial institution. If the borrower cannot repay his
loan, he defaults and loses his collateral--the  shares he bought with the loan.  In view of the
shaky condition  of the financial system, this course is not wise.A'
In some schemes (such as those being  discussed in Poland), it is suggested  that to spur
widespread  ownership  the interest  on the loans be subsidized  and tied to dividend  payouts.
This further reduces  the costs and risks of borrowers.
If the government appropriates  the receipts of sales, and spends  them, the result might well
be inflationary. For this reason the proceeds  should be used only to retire internal  or
external debt.
Apart from using the credit instrument  to facilitate  sales, some thought has been given to the
manner of sale.  The choice narrows down to the government  setting a price and selling directly  to
the public or the government  selling the shares at auction (with or without a reservation price).  In
most developing  countries  the most popular  technique  has been sale to single owners.4'  As the
volume of sales is likely to be large, this is not seriously contemplated  in Eastern Europe.  One idea
has been to divide investors into several groups and to use information  from one auction in setting the
reservation price for the next auction.  This is the notion underlying  Kawalec's (1989) proposal that
foreign investors would be allowed to bid only for the first 20 percent of shares (so that price would
be relatively  high and capital gain small). The price from the first round of auctions, reduced by say
10 to 20 percent, would then be used as the reservation  price for the second auction, open to domestic
investors only.  Unsold shares would be kept by the government  (as preferred shares) and sold later.
45/  Whether this is inflationary or not depends upon several factors, including the prior  fiscal position, the size of
the monetary emission, the speed with which the money is spent, capacity utilization in the economy, and so
on.  If the asset transfer is large, then the process will be inflationary.  The permanent addition to household
aii  individual wealth through the purchase of equity will, in either case, also likely result in increased domestic
spending.
46/  This difficulty appeared in the Chilean pr.vatizations, with disastrous consequences for certain segments of the
banking system.  See P. A. Yotopoulos (1989).
47/  See Nankani (1990), p.  44.22
D.  External  Privatization--Foreign  Investors
Advantages. Selling assets to foreigners  is fairly straightforward  and has two important  putative
benefits. First, foreigners are assumed to bring with them superior management,  business  know-how,
and improved  technology. Second, the country earns foreign exchange  through the transactionAl.
There are other less obvious advantages  such as opening  the economy  to outside influence,
strengthening international  links, and joining global networks  of production. Liberalization  and
foreign involvement  also help make reforms less reversible.
Disadvantages  Few prescriptions  in privatization  debates appear to be as contentious  as that of
selling assets to foreigners.4' The fear is the obvious  one:  that control over national  assets, which
represent the accumulation  of decades  of national  savings and investment,  will simply  be turned over
to outsiders. While most acknowledge  the benefits  of foreign participation,  there are often proposals
to limit such activity to a share of total national  assetsM  or to a set number  of enterprises.
Selling assets to foreigners does invite difficulties  unless the transactions  are well-managed. The
economy  faces the potential  permanent  loss of the net income  stream generated  by the foreign-held
enterprise as net profits are remitted abroad. In general, this should not matter if the price at which
the enterprise is sold is "right," since, in theory, the purchase  sum could  be invested  to obtain the
same return elsewhere. However, in situations  of great uncertainty  and with the inadequate  valuation
noted earlier, determining  the correct price is far from easy.  That this is not simply academic is
illustrated  by two recent and heavily criticized  Hungarian  transactions. In the first, shares in a major
electric  bulb manufacturer  were sold to one foreign  group, which then sold them to another at a 50
percent capital gain; in the second, an important  vehicle manufacturer  was effectively  sold for a very
small downpayment,  with future payments  to be made out of revenues.
E.  External Privatization  - The Role of Institutional  Investors
External  privatization  will be open not only to individual  investors but also to institutional
investors--banks,  pension funds, universities,  trusts, insurance  funds, mutual funds, and so on.  In
market economies,  institutional  investors are quite the most prominent  form of investor. In the  UK,
for instance, a little less than two-thirds  of all publicly quoted  shares are held by institutional
investors. In Japan and Italy, institutions  hold more thaa three-quarters  of all shares; such investors
hold about one-half  of total value of shares quoted  at the New York Stock Exchange, with pension
funds alone accounting  for more than 10 percent.  Controllers  of large pools of financial  assets, in
short, are substantial  owners in advanced capitalist  societies.
Institutional  investors do not exist in the reforming socialist economies. Where there is
potential--banks,  for instance--the  institutions  are almost entirely  state-owned  and will need to be
converted into private companies  before they can meaningfully  take on an active role as private
48/  As noted earlier, the  treasury may not see  any of the money.  In some of the recent  'spontaneous
transfonmations'  in Hungary,  the foreign  exchange  to purchase  the firms remained  either within  the firms, i.e.,
they made gift of themselves,  or with the banks which effectively  'owned" the firms through large loans
outstanding.
49/  This position  is to be distinguished  from allowing  foreigners  to forrn  new companies. Virtually  all countries
have few restrictions  on foreign capital  forming  new joint ventures  or establishing  new enterprises.
LO/  In a recent  proposal  on holding  companies  in Poland,  it has been suggested  that foreigners  be limitedl  to holding
10 percent  of holding  company  stock.23
stockholders  in other firms.  This will, in the case of banks, require a cleaning  up of portfolios  and
inijection  of new capital along with considerable  institution  building. The question  about the role of
institutional  investors in the privatization  process is thus the broader qucstion  of whether institutional
investing  provides a useful social service beyond that provided  by small investors and whether,
therefore, institutional  investors should be encouraged  and developed.
According  to some views, the advantages  of institutional  investors reside in their better ability to
monitor a firm's managers. Tnis comes because institutions  tend to be large shareholders  and thus
find it in their interest to develop greater capacity  than individuals  to track and assess enterprise
performance. As large shareholders,  they can more easily replace  a poor management  team.
Specialization  also allows economies  of scale; it facilitates  higher degrees of professionalism  than is
available to the small investor  and thus allows institutional  investors  to make better portfolio
decisions. In some cases, institutional  investors,  because of their close interest ir. and greater
leverage over enterprise affairs, may provide professional  services  to enterprises  to assist them in
making better decisions.
These propositions, drawn from general considerations,  are not universally  accepted. Some, for
instance, remain dubious about the claim  that institutional  investors  outperform individuals  in the
quality of investment  decisions.a'  Nor is it clear that all institutional  investors  are particularly
interested in taking up supervisory  directorships  in companies  or that they would be professionally
suited for such tasks.
Nonetheless,  the broader point is that privatizatiun  provides an opportunity  to foster the financial
sector, not simply  through developing  security markets  but also through creating or strengthening
institutions  that may play a prominent  future role as lenders  of financial  capital or as holders of
equity.
In this respect, the roles of banks, pension  funds, and holding companies  (see next section) need
further analysis. In the case of commercial  banks, several channels  for development  appear available.
First, as has happened  in Hungary and Yugoslavia,  banks may convert some of the badly performing
loans on their books into equity; these holdings may then be sold, or else banks may proceed to
restructure the poorly performing enterprises. Second, banks could independently  invest in equity of
enterprises without  first converting  bad loans.  In the West German  model, banks have traditionally
had an important  role as financiers and stockholders  in their clients. Through holding  proxy voting
rights for small investors, they have secured  seats as directors on the supervisory  boards of
enterprises.'  They provide professional  advice and expertise  to clients, often well beyond that of
normal "finance." Moreover, they are the country's only legal stockbrokers;  firms that wish to
acquire a public quotation  have to go through a bankA.  Opinion  naturally  differs on how efficient,
effective, and responsive this system is.  Nonetheless  it does p:ovide a point of departure for
considering  the role of banks in East Europe's privatization  process.  This is especially  so since
financial  and capital market skills are so scarce and the "infrastructure"  of capital markets  does not
exist.
LI/  See  B. Malkiel  (1985).
52/  In 1980  bank directors  held about 10 percent of seats in the hundred  largest corporations. Quoted in Carson
(1990).
jQ/  Ibid  p. 628.24
The case for developing  pension funds as institutional  investors  consists of two arguments: first,
intergenerational  equity and second. giving pension schemes  a sound financial  footing in the early
stages of the reform process.  Insofar as national  assets are to be parcelled out to individuals  or
groups, it seems just and fair to reserve some fraction for pensions. This will ensure that a
proportion  of the future income  flows generated  from today's assets will be used to finance the
retirement  of current and prior generations  of workers. The alternatives  are to have company-based
pension schemes  or to use the general revenue  to finance retirement. Company-based  schemes, at the
present juncture, would be highly discriminatory,  since the performance  and prospects  of different
companies  vary greatly.  Establishing  pension funds that hold diversified  portfolios of assets
overcomes  this problem from the worker's perspective. As important, it also relieves (perhaps  only
partially  to begin with) the treasury of having  to use scarce tax revenues  to pay for worker
retirements,  since these can be financed through the dividends  received  from enterprises.
F.  Holdin.g  Companies5'
In view of the many difficulties  in the divestiture  models discussed  above, holding companies  are
frequently  discussed  as possible vehicles for privatization.5' Proposals  come in many varieties  but
essentially  comprise three components: first, most enterprises  in the economy  are either given to or
sold to holding companies;  second, shares in holding companies  are either sold or given to the public
(including, in some proposals, to foreign investors);  third, holding  companies  themselves  are expected
to exercise some management  and restructuring  functions  and eventually  to bring the enterprises  under
their control to market.
Advantages. The main advantage  of the holding  company  model is that it allows for fast
privatization  (if shares in the holding companies  are sold or distributed  free to the population).
Moreover, because  of the pooling of enterprises  in holding  companies, shares in these are likely to be
intrinsically  less risky.  This is a factor of some advantage  in conditions  of limited and dispersed
information  and where a culture of holding financial  assets is just beginning  to be established.
Holding companies, moreover, could sever ties between  enterprises  and ministries and thus cut the
informal links and bargaining over credits, subsidies, tax preferences, and so on that have
traditionally  bedeviled  reform efforts.  Holding companies  could also, in principle, exercise
ownership  interest on behalf of their shareholders  and implement  much-needed  reforms at the
enterprise level to improve performance.
Disadvantages. Despite such advantages,  there are questions  about potential  operations. Are not
holding  companies  in fact the "same old system" except at one remove? To transform  the "owners"
of enterprises  from founding organs to holding  companies  requires no great magic.  What will be
more difficult  to achieve will be to insulate  holding companies  from political pressures  and allow
them the mrrandate  to make some very difficult  decisions  concerning  enterprise restructuring - plant
closures, la' offs, redundancies, and ultimately  privatization. Great power will be granted to small
boards of (unelected)  officials to take some highly  visible decisions. Holding companies  could
become "captives"  of the enterprises  they own or of the government.
Because  of these difficulties  there is a danger that "slow" privatization  will become no
privatization  at all.  Through inertia or the exercise of political power, holdings will not be divested
to the public.
54/  The following comments have benefited from notes prepared by A. Gelb, J.  Nellis, and G. Yarrow.
5S/  Holding companies are being used in Algeria as the main instrument for securing divestiture.  Experience to
late, however, is insufficient to draw any general conclusions.25
A further question  is whether, in fact, holding  companies  will be able to provide the kind of
management  required effectively  to monitor and oversee  the firms they own.  To the extent that
businesses  are specialized, the answer must be no.  Moreover, it is increasingly  apparent  that
management  contracts, leases, and various other devices that may be used to establish arms-length
incentive  contracts with enterprise management,  N' are difficult  to devise and difficult  to administer.
The improvements  sought in enterprise performance  through improved  management  via holding
companies  may not materialize. Indeed, some opponents  suggest that holding companies  should not
even get into the business of enterprise restructuring,  for they have no special expertise.
CONCLUSIONS
An essay largely devoted to a taxonomic  discussion  of objectives,  constraints, and models of
divestiture  in privatization  programs does not yield to easy summary. Some concluding  observations
are nonetheless  possible.
The plethora of divestiture  options does not simplify choice. From an individual  perspective  the
choice  of preferred model will vary depending  upon the choice of objectives,  the weights given to the
objectives,  and the appreciation  (or dismissal)  of practical  difficulties  in implementation. In this
respect there is no "correct" answer about how to privatize. Decisions  are highly political, mediated
through still emerging  processes, invoking  strong interests  and lobbies, and with a genuine possibility
of popular  backlash in societies  sensitive  to wide divergences  of wealth. Howsoever  privatization
strategies emerge from this process, certain questions  deserve continuing  reflection. Should the
privatization  process be fast or slow?  Does the State need the revenues  from privatization? Should
enterprises  be demonopolized  before being privatized? Should enterprises  be financially  and
technically  restructured before being privatized,  or can this be left to new owners!  How can
ownership arrangements  be instituted  so that the new owners take an interest in performance? All
these questions  involve multidimensional,  and not simple, answers.
Divestiture models  are not exclusive. It may be perfectly  possible, in fact, to combine giving
workers and managers a stake in their firms, granting  a proportion  of enterprise equity to the general
population  (either directly or through institutions),  and obtaining  revenue for the State through general
sales.  These "combination"  options are beginning  to surface in privatization  debates and deserve
considerably  more elaboration  and defense  than they have had thus far.
Whether privatization  is fast or slow is really only relative. Even in the best of scenarios, it is
unlikely that the majority  of State assets can be divested in less than a few years.  The near-complete
unpreparedness  of the legal, financial, and fiscal environments  underpin this expectation.
During this period when firms are readied for divestiture, it may be expected  that governments
will be besieged by waves of requests for exemptions,  concessions,  protection, and so on, from firms
about  to be privatized or from new owners. It will be extremely  important  to resist these pressures.
The improvement  in economic  performance  that is one of the major objectives  of reform programs
will be considerably  diluted if the new market economy  is based on an extensive  network of special
privileges. Moreover, experience  from elsewhere  testifies to the difficulty  of removing  concessions
once given.  It is imperative  therefore not only that the privatization  process be seen to be transparent
and absolutely  above reproach but that the rules of the "market" game are also clearly enunciated  and
adhered to in divestitures.
56/  See Newport (1989) and Nellis (1988).26
Divestiture will be an integral  aspect of the development  of financial  sectors.  The continuing
evolution  of banking systems, pension funds, insurance  companies,  securities markets, and the like
will all be shaped by decisions  concerning  the depth, scale, speed, and mechanisms  of privatization.
There is great benefit in considering  these complex  issues together. In particular, a pure "case-by-
case" approach  to the privatization  process may well miss out on substantial  opportunities  to
strengthen  and help construct a modern  and sophisticated  financial system. Indeed, unless the
strategies for financial  sector development  and privatization  are coordinated,  weaknesses  in the former
may lead to ad hoc and perhaps haphazard  approaches  to privatization. The activities  of privatization
offices should, in this regard, be subordinated  to this wider perspective.
Finally, governments  will need to pay attention  to the majority of State enterprises  that will take
time to be privatized  or are otherwise left in their ward.  Encouraging  a market orienitation  and
fostering  responsiveness  to economic  signals in these enterprises  will present a major challenge. The
wide variety of incentive  devices--management  contracts, leases, bonuses  tied to performance--should
be explored  in this context.  As important,  governments  must ensure that there is no discrimination
favoring State enterprises (credit allocation,  State orders, looser financial  discipline), in contrast  to the
rules for the developing  private sector.27
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